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Abstract 
Governments provide various forms of financial support for sustaining unprofitable regional airways, 
especially when such airways are essential to local livelihoods and economies. However, inefficient provision 
of subsidies has been subject to worldwide criticism. Therefore, this study examines the load factor guarantee, 
a dynamically interdependent business model for airline-airport coexistence where an airline and an airport 
agree on the load factor of a flight, after which either party compensates for any discrepancies between the 
actual and agreed-upon load factor. The model is calibrated by using 2003–2014 data regarding Noto Airport 
and All Nippon Airways, and system dynamics are employed to model the dynamic interactions between the 
two parties. The findings show that successful coexistence between an airline and an airport hinges on the 
integral management of annual negotiations regarding the target load factor and the monthly demand 
adjustment of subsidies. In addition, although a subsidy represents a temporary financial loss for an airport, it 
is an effective way of maintaining long-term, airline–airport coexistence. This model is applicable to 
unprofitable airways worldwide, and it contributes to their sustainable management. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In general, regional air transportation is characterized by thin air traffic demand with wide fluctuations. 
Thus, its operational efficiency is lower than that of trunk routes (Suzuki et al., 1995). Critical factors for 
enhancing the profitability of regional air transportation include fleet selection and daily frequency (Sato et al., 
1990). However, at the micro level, air traffic demand forecasts are imprecise (Lyneis, 2000), adding to an 
airline’s difficulties when making decisions and developing new regional airways. 
In order to reduce the business risk associated with the entry of a new regional airway, governments 
provide financial support when air travel demand is expected to be low and air transportation is particularly 
important to local livelihoods and economies (Minato and Morimoto, 2010, 2011a). Various measures, such 
as profit loss compensations, landing fee reductions, and fuel tax reductions, are then put in place (Nomura 
and Kiritoshi, 2010). However, these measures do not essentially mitigate the problem. In addition, 
anticipated social changes prevent regional air transport systems from solely relying on public financing. 
The financial issue becomes more critical when regional air transport systems are not fully supported by 
governments. For example, in Japan, although air routes to remote islands are subsidized by the central 
government (Matsumoto, 2007; Minato and Morimoto, 2011b), there are specific conditions in terms of 
alternative transportation measures and competitions. Moreover, if an airport is not located on an island, it is 
out of the scope. As a result, the local government that owns the airport must prepare a special financial 
treatment in order to sustain the airway. However, such subsidies have been criticized in numerous studies, 
due to their inefficiency (Williams and Pagliari, 2004; Santana, 2009; Grubesic and Matisziw, 2011; Lian and 
Ronnevik, 2011; Matisziw 1and Grubesic, 2012). Thus, introducing a gaming situation between an airline and 
an airport might improve such inefficiency through interactive decision-making processes. 
In this regard, the present paper examines the load factor guarantee (LFG), a dynamically 
interdependent business model that attempts to share the business risk between an airline and an airport 
(Figure 1). This model might be able to manage the sustainability of airways, based on market principles in 
which each player acts for a better payoff in commercial activities. The LFG is an agreement under which   an 
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airline and an airport (usually owned by a local government in Japan) negotiate the load factor of regional 
flights beforehand. The airport and government then compensate for any discrepancies between the actual and 
the agreed-upon load factor. An airline may also transfer a portion of its revenues to a local government when 
the actual load factor is higher than the guaranteed load factor (Noto Airport Promotion Council (NAPC), 
2012). The LFG allows airlines to maintain load factors above the breakeven level, and thus, it encourages 
them to enter new regional air routes, even when profitability is uncertain. In addition, the owner of the airport, 
the local government, is encouraged to increase the number of local air passengers in order to enhance the 
load factor of a regional airway. As a result, a symbiotic relationship between an airline and an airport is 
established through this business model. 
 
Load Factor 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A dynamically interdependent business model between the airline and airport 
 
Many researchers have analyzed the efficiency of the Japanese regional air transport system. Yoshida 
and Fujimoto (2004) employed data envelope analysis (DEA) to evaluate 67 Japanese airports. Their findings 
indicate that airports on the Japanese islands are more efficient than those on the mainland. Barros et al. 
(2010) used the Malmquist input-based index to evaluate 16 Japanese airports operating from 1987 to 2005. 
They found that the airports (on average) became less efficient and experienced technological regression. Kato 
et al. (2011) analyzed the financial records of 41 Japanese airports and concluded that the “airports managed 
by local governments are very difficult to sustain financially without subsidy.” In general, 5.2 million 
passengers are required for airport profitability. However, most Japanese regional airports have fewer than 2.5 
million passengers (Kato et al., 2011). Many researchers have concluded that the Japanese air transport system 
is far from efficient and as a result, measures need to be taken in order to reduce/eliminate such inefficiency. 
Inefficiency of regional air transport systems has been discussed worldwide as national subsidy program 
issues. For example, in the United States, the Essential Air Service (EAS) is a government program that 
provides a minimum level of air transport service for small communities and connects them through carrier 
hubs to the national network (Grubesic and Matisziw, 2011). In Europe, the Public Service Obligation (PSO) 
ensures “minimum” levels of air service to remote areas by subsidizing non-commercial routes (Lian and 
Ronnevik, 2011). Santana (2009) compared the EAS and the PSO in order to find higher costs for airlines 
under the PSO program. Grubesic and Matisziw (2011) pointed out that market coverage is often redundant 
and suggested alternative definitions of “community eligibility” that would increase programmatic efficiency 
and reduce federal spending on subsidies. Lian and Ronnevik (2011) noted the disadvantages of  only 
providing subsidies for local residents and argued that regional non-residents must pay full fares, which, in 
turn, restrict the potential for incoming tourism. 
Studies have shown two essential trends in managing an unsustainable regional air transport system. 
The first is the removal of inefficiency from the system in order to realize healthier management. In this 
regard, researchers tend to evaluate the productivity of airlines and airports as well as  promote natural 
selection through competition. The second trend is the survival of the system depending on resources drawn 
from outside the system. Based on this approach, various national subsidy programs for airlines and airports 
can be found worldwide. However, it is important to explore another measure in which each regional air 
transport stakeholder bilaterally relies on others while coexisting in a market, rather than competing with them 
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t O 
or being parasitic on public financing. It is expected that the LFG scheme will be one of the measures to 
achieve the overall objective. 
Limited studies have been conducted on the LFG scheme. Hihara (2007) analyzed the LFG agreement 
between Ishikawa Prefecture and All Nippon Airways (ANA) in Japan. His study attempted to forecast future 
load factors and pay-offs by considering the impact of the LFG agreement on both parties’ decision-making 
processes. However, the results were not significant, due to the scarcity of data. Fukuyama et al. (2009) 
analyzed the LFG agreement between Tottori Prefecture in Japan and Korea’s Asiana Airlines. Their research 
considered the LFG as a Nash bargaining competition between the airline and the local government, and 
examined the rationality of negotiations by using multivariate regression analysis. The negotiations between 
the two aforementioned parties yielded an approximate Nash bargaining solution in 2007.  The 
abovementioned studies also analyzed the LFG by using mathematical modeling with static data input. 
However, they did not consider multi-year dynamic interactions between the airline and the airport (Hihara, 
2011, 2012), which could significantly affect the future state of the business model. 
The purpose of the present paper is to identify key success factors for managing the LFG scheme by 
analyzing the feedback effect of each party’s decision-making process on long-term, airline-airport 
coexistence. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the methodology used for 
evaluation, while Section 3 provides an overview of the model structure and describes the results of model 
building. Section 4 includes the analysis and discussions based on the simulation results. Finally, Section 5 
summarizes the conclusions and presents the paper’s limitations. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
In order to reproduce the LFG scheme, this paper employed system dynamics (SD), which is a method 
(developed by Jay Forrester of MIT in the 1950s) that models the nonlinear dynamics of complex systems 
(Sterman, 2000). Stock and flow diagrams (SFDs) use several graphical icons, such as stock, flow, valve, and 
cloud icons, to express system structures (Figure 2). In addition, stocks are integrated accumulations of 
inflows and outflows. Inflows are represented by pipes leading into a stock, whereas outflows are represented 
by pipes leading out of a stock. Valves in the middle of each pipe control the inflows and outflows. 
Furthermore, clouds represent sources, while flows represent sinks (Sterman, 2000). For mathematical 
modeling, system dynamism utilizes both integral (Eq. 1) and differential (Eq. 2) equations. Assume that the 
system state is represented by Stock (t) and calculated as follows: 
 Stock (t) = ft [Inflow(s) − Outflow(s)]ds + Stock (t ) 0 Eq. (1) 
where tO is the initial time, t is terminal time, inflow is a connected flow directed toward Stock, and outflow is a connected flow directed away from Stock. The differential of Stock at time t is then calculated as follows: d(Stock) = Inflow (t) − Outflow (t) Eq. dt 
(2) 
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Figure 2. Stock and flow diagram (SFD) 
 
SD assumes rational decisions, which are not always the case in airline-airport negotiations. However, it 
is useful for understanding macroscopic system behaviors in the long run. Moreover, SD was selected in this 
paper to integrate two different time scales: 1) annual decisions and 2) monthly decisions. For example, the 
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target load factor, a goal for the system, is negotiated between an airline and an airport on an annual basis. It is 
counted at the end of a year by considering all of the operation results within the year. However, both parties 
can react to the demand scarcity in a shorter time scale. For example, an airline can control ticket prices daily, 
weekly, or monthly. Furthermore, an airport can change the amount of subsidies monthly or quarterly. To 
integrate these different decision time scales, this paper introduced a stock and flow modeling of SD (which 
represents physical and information flows), based on information feedback controls that are continuously 
converted into decisions and actions (Suryani et al., 2010). It is assumed that the demand control decisions are 
made by both parties monthly and the results are accumulated in a stock for deciding the following year’s 
target load factor. 
 
3. Model development 
 
3.1. Model architecture 
The SD model was developed to calibrate a general LFG management framework adopted by an airline 
and an airport. The model consists of four different subsystems: 1) flight and passenger; 2) demand 
adjustment; 3) target load factor adjustment; and 4) LFG. Figure 3 presents a subsystem diagram that 
describes the overall model architecture. The subsystems are presented in the rectangles, while the decision 
entities (airline and airport) are included in the ovals. 
Depending on its flight strategy, an airline provides flights by considering flight frequency and fleet size. 
The strategy defines supply in terms of the number of seats, while an estimate of the number of passengers is 
based on historical market demand data. The flight and passenger subsystem generates the annual load  factor 
as an input for the LFG subsystem. The airline and airport negotiate within the load factor adjustment 
subsystem and generate a target load factor as an input for the LFG subsystem. Payment is computed based on 
the discrepancy between the annual actual and targeted load factors. When a certain discrepancy exists 
between the two parties, an airport with financial support from the local government attempts to stimulate 
passenger demand by providing subsidies. In addition, an airline attempts to control passenger demand by 
changing the ticket prices. Their reactions bring about demand changes as an input for the LFG subsystem. 
Thus, airline-airport coexistence is expected to be maintained via the dynamic interaction between the two 
parties. 
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Figure 3. Model overview 
 
3.2. The flight and passenger subsystem 
Figure 4 shows the SFD of a flight and passenger subsystem. There are two stocks in the model: 1) the 
accumulated number of seats provided, which generates supply for the system; and 2) the accumulated 
number of passengers, which generates natural demand for the system. The annual load factor is computed 
using these two stock variables. Moreover, a stock and flow structure is used to compute the annual load 
factor in each month by accumulating monthly records. 
The monthly number of seats provided, a source of inflow into the stock, is computed as the product of 
four variables: 1) the number of days per month; 2) the number of flights per day; 3) the number of seats per 
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aircraft; and 4) operation reliability. Each variable is set based on historical data. The monthly supply is 
accumulated into the stock for 12 months and it is discarded at the end of a year by using the pulse train 
function in the Vensim software program. 
The other inflow into the stock (i.e., the monthly number of passengers) is computed by totaling 
monthly passenger demand, subsidized passenger demand, and demand change by price. Monthly passenger 
demand is a natural demand (based on historical data) calculated by using the lookup function in the Vensim 
software program. Subsidized passenger demand and demand change by price are computed using the demand 
adjustment subsystem, which is explained later. Monthly demand is accumulated into the stock for 12 months 
and discarded at the end of a year. This move might not be practical for air transport business operations. 
However, the model described herein was designed to simulate the game between an airline and an airport. At 
the end of each year, they compute the average load factor for the year in order to determine payments to one 
another, and the result does not influence the following year’s passenger demand. 
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Figure 4. The flight and passenger subsystem 
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3.3. The LFG subsystem 
Figure 5 shows the SFD for the LFG subsystem. Two main stocks are used in the model: 1)  the 
financial stock of the airline, calculated by using Eq. 3; and 2) the financial stock of the airport, calculated by 
using Eq. 4. Here “financial stock” refers to the latest cash position of the airline and the airport. It also 
facilitates the evaluation of their financial status via the monitoring of these stock variables. “Additional 
passenger revenues” is calculated by using Eq. 5, while the impact of ticket price change is calculated by 
using Eq. 6. 
An airport pays the guarantee fee, which is calculated by using Eq. 7, when the annual load factor is 
lower than the target load factor. An airline pays the cooperation fee, which is calculated by using Eq. 8, when 
the annual load factor is higher than the target load factor. Each payment is calculated at the end of a year, 
according to clearance. 
 Financial Stock of Airline = I Guarantee Fee − Cooperation Fee + Additional Passenger Revenues 
− Impact of Ticket Price Change 
 
Eq. (3) 
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Eq. (4) 
= Average Ticket Price × (Subsidiezed Passenger Demand + Demand Change by Price) 
Eq. (5) Impact of Ticket Price Change = Price Adjustment × Monthly Passenger Demand Guarantee Fee = If then else (Target Load Factor > Annual Load Factor, Accumulated Number of Seats Provided 1 
 
Eq. (6) 
× Discrepancy of Load Factor × × Airport Unit Payment × Clearance, 0) 2  Eq. (7) Cooperation Fee = If then else (Annual Load Factor >  Target Load  Factor, Accumulated Number of Seats  Provided 1 × Discrepancy of Load Factor × 
2 × Airline Unit Payment  × Clearance, 0)  Eq. (8) 
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Figure 5. The load factor guarantee subsystem 
 
3.4. The target load factor adjustment subsystem 
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Figure 6 shows the SFD of the target load factor adjustment subsystem. The model comprises one stock 
variable, i.e., the target load factor. Each stakeholder negotiates to adjust the target load factor according to 
the discrepancy in the load factor. The target load factor increases when the annual load factor is higher than 
the target load factor of the previous year, whereas it decreases when the annual load factor is lower than the 
target load factor. The target load factor adjustment rate (TAR) defines the adjusted discrepancy, which serves 
as the target load factor adjustment. 
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Figure 6. The target load factor adjustment subsystem 
 
3.5. The demand adjustment subsystem 
Figure 7 shows the SFD of the demand adjustment subsystem. Demand is adjusted according to the 
discrepancy between the target load factor and the annual load factor of the previous year and the demand 
adjustment rate. It is assumed that demand adjustment is based on controlling ticket prices by implementing 
two different measures; namely, subsidy by airport and price change by airline. Ticket price elasticity of 
demand is computed by using Eq. 9 (Murakami et al., 2008). 
 (qt+1-qt)/qt Price Elasticity of Demand (et) = − (p -p )/p Eq. t+1 t t 
(9) 
 
where q is demand and p is price. It is also assumed that price elasticity of demand is fixed throughout the 
simulation and it is set at −0.74 (Yamauchi, 2000) in the baseline simulation. However, other scenarios can be 
examined by changing this value. 
Regarding the price elasticity coefficient, recent studies have provided different estimations. For 
example, Mizutani (2011) estimated it as −0.921, based on 1994–2007 data. However, this estimation was 
made according to the passenger revenue per passenger-km, which is not the same as the ticket price elasticity 
coefficient (required for simulation). Moreover, Murakami et al. (2015) estimated it as −0.839, based on the 
14 routes in Japan (from 2 to 11 years). However, the route-specific unbalanced data constraints are valid as 
coefficients for long-term simulation. Furthermore, Lo et al. (2015) investigated the price elasticities of air 
cargo demand in Hong Kong and found that it ranges from −0.74 to −0.29 during the 2001–2013 time period. 
Overall, the price elasticity coefficient depends on industry sectors and countries, and it must be carefully 
selected according to the simulation purpose. Yamauchi’s estimation was conducted as “the long-term price 
elasticity of air travel in Japan” (2000), and thus, the use of −0.74 is appropriate for the present paper’s long- 
term simulation model development. 
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By substituting Eq. 9, the required decrease in ticket price is computed according to Eq. 10, which 
defines the subsidy per ticket. The total subsidy amount is computed as the product of subsidized passenger 
demand and subsidy per ticket. The subsidy payment is accumulated in the stock of accumulated amount of 
subsidy. The amounts that an airport and a local government should spend were evaluated by adjusting the 
average load factor. It is assumed that an airline proactively changes ticket prices when the demand is 
insufficient. Considering the expected ticket price in Eq. 11, an airline attempts to fill the price gap between 
average ticket price and expected ticket price. In addition, price adjustment is computed according to Eq. 12, 
and demand change by price is computed according to Eq. 13. 
 Required Decrease in Ticket Price = −  (qt+1-qt)×pt qt×et Eq. (10) Expected Ticket Price = Fixed Ticket Price − Required Decrease of Ticket Price Eq. 
(11) 
 Price Adjustment = Price Gap   Price Adjustment Time Eq. 
(12) 
Demand Change by Price = −  
Price Adjustment×qt×et pt 
 
Eq. 
(13) 
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Figure 7. The demand adjustment subsystem 
 
3.6. Data for model building 
Data regarding the Haneda–Noto flight in Japan was used since it was deemed suitable for the 
simulation, based on two key reasons. First, the Haneda–Noto route has operated from Noto Airport since it 
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opened in 2003, thus providing a stream of uninterrupted data. Second, the prefecture government owns and 
manages the airport, and it has supported ANA and its passengers through an LFG. This particular LFG 
requires ANA to operate twice-daily flights between Haneda and Noto. Whenever the annual load factors fall 
below the guaranteed threshold, the prefectural government covers the difference by paying a guarantee fee to 
ANA. On the other hand, when the load factor exceeds the guaranteed load factor, ANA transfers some 
revenue (i.e., the cooperation fee) to the prefectural government. These agreements have sustained the twice- 
daily flights since the airport opened in 2003. The flight and passenger records are presented in the Appendix 
(NAPC, 2015). 
For this particular LFG, both parties have agreed on a maximum payment amount and guaranteed load 
factor ranges, which have exempted both parties from payments since 2005 (Fukuyama et al., 2009; Minato 
and Morimoto, 2011b; Hihara, 2012). For example, in 2005, the target load factor was 64%. In this case, the 
government was required to only pay ANA when the actual load factor fell below 63%, while ANA only had 
to pay the government when the load factor exceeded 65% (NAPC, 2010). The present model excludes the 
maximum payment and the guaranteed load factor ranges in order to arrive at a more generalized LFG 
simulation model. 
It is believed that the application of the LFG in the foreign market is technically possible. However, the 
application of the model requires further surveys regarding various factors such as the country, the airline, the 
airport, the government, and the community. The parameters for the simulation model must be carefully 
adjusted according to market conditions. Furthermore, macro-economic factors, socio-geographic factors, and 
special constraints on a particular country should be investigated for better SD modeling (Minato, 2013). 
Finally, to facilitate the modeling process, fundamental information in Table 4 is summarized in the Appendix. 
 
3.7. Model testing 
The model was tested by using historical data regarding the Haneda–Noto flight in 2003 and 2004, since 
the average load factor in each of those years exceeded the guaranteed load factor and ANA transferred some 
of its revenue to the prefectural government as a cooperation fee. Thus, it is possible to examine the system’s 
behavior according to the actual reactions of both parties. Two datasets were compared in terms of payment of 
the cooperation fee or the guarantee fee: Xd (historical data) and Xm (model output). In addition, two 
measures were used for examining the data fit (i.e., the mean absolute error (MAE) and the mean absolute 
percentage error (MAPE)) for each item for the two years. Both the MAE and the MAPE provide a measure 
of the average error between the simulated and actual datasets (Sterman, 2000), even though the MAPE is 
dimensionless. 
Table 1 lists the model testing results. Regarding the guarantee fee, the simulation results are identical 
to the historical data regarding both 2003 and 2004. The model succeeded in reproducing past behaviors. 
Regarding the cooperation fee, there were cash transfers from ANA to Ishikawa Prefecture in both 2003 and 
2004. The actual amount transferred in 2003 was 811,000 USD and the simulation result was 811,562 USD (a 
deviation of only 562 USD). In 2004, the actual amount paid was 133,167 USD, while the simulation result 
was 136,766 USD (a deviation of only 3,599 USD). Furthermore, the MAE was 2,081 USD, while the MAPE 
was 1.4%. The simulated cooperation fee payout deviated slightly from the historical data, but it is opined that 
the model can appropriately reproduce macroscopic system behaviors for further simulation. 
 
Table 1. Model testing results 
 2003 2004 MAE MAPE 
Cooperation Fee (USD) Xd 811,000 133,167 2,081 1.4% 
Xm 811,562 136,766 
Guarantee Fee (USD) Xd 0 0 0 0.0% 
Xm 0 0 
 
4. Results and discussions 
 
In this paper, four different scenarios were examined: 1) baseline; 2) target load factor adjustment; 3) 
demand adjustment; and 4) combination. The baseline scenario does not include any measure of impact on the 
system. The target load factor adjustment scenario includes an adjustment to the rate of the guaranteed load 
factor. The  demand  adjustment  scenario consists  of a  demand  adjustment  using ticket  subsidies and price 
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change, while the combination scenario includes both target load factor adjustment and demand adjustment. 
For each scenario, the simulation was run for 120 months (10 years). The simulation period was identical to 
the period of flight operation (2005–2014) for which the time-series monthly demand data was acquired (see 
the Appendix). 
 
4.1. The baseline scenario 
The baseline scenario was set assuming no target load factor adjustment or demand adjustment.  Figure 
8 shows the financial stocks of the airline and the airport. The movements of each financial stock are 
horizontally symmetrical to the even level since neither party undertook any adjustment actions. The 
difference between the airline and the airport can be explained by the results of the guarantee fee and the 
cooperation fee (Figure 9). Initially, the airline continuously paid the cooperation fee to the airport since there 
was adequate air passenger demand. The amount of these payments gradually decreased over time due to a 
decrease in passenger demand. However, the trend began to change around the fifth year, due to decreased 
passenger demand. As a result, the airport had to pay the guarantee fee to the airline in order to cover the 
discrepancy in the load factor. Figure 9 shows that both parties win and lose at various times. Thus, the 
airline-airport relationship is not a path-dependent system, implying that the payment amounts will probably 
be balanced over the long term, according to demand movement. However, it must be highlighted that the 
airline temporarily bore the negative financial situation over the entire simulation period. This situation might 
force the airline to cease commercial operations on the selected route. Based on these findings, it is concluded 
that the airway is not likely to be sustainable under the baseline scenario. This paper then examined a certain 
measure for enhancing airline-airport coexistence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 8. Financial stocks of the airline and airport 
(baseline scenario) 
Figure 9. Guarantee fee and cooperation fee 
(baseline scenario) 
 
 
4.2. The target load factor adjustment scenario 
The target load factor adjustment scenario was examined by highlighting the target load factor 
adjustment subsystem. It is assumed that both parties negotiate to adjust the target load factor, according to the 
load factor discrepancy in the previous year. Then, a parametric study was implemented on the target load 
factor adjustment rate (TAR), setting it to 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%, without any adjustment to the demand 
side. 
Figures 10a–d show the financial stocks of the airline and the airport under the target load factor 
adjustment scenarios. At 25% TAR (Figure 10a), the discrepancy between the two parties is smaller than that 
in the baseline scenario (Figure 8) in the first six years. This implies that the load factor adjustment positively 
affects sustainability. However, the time-series behaviors changed after the seventh year. The airline 
continuously accumulated cash into its stock, while the airport continuously lost cash from its stock. This 
discrepancy in financial stocks generally increased over time, implying that load factor adjustment negatively 
impacted sustainability. At 50% TAR (Figure 10b), the global trend in time-series behaviors is the same as 
that at 25% TAR. However, there is less discrepancy between the two parties. This finding implies that the 
situation is more favorable for the airline and the airport, especially from the viewpoint of sustaining their 
commercial relationship. Furthermore, at 75% TAR (Figure 10c), the global trend in the time-series behaviors 
is the same as that at 25% TAR and 50% TAR. However, there is much less discrepancy between the two 
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parties. This result indicates that, as TAR increases, the discrepancy between the financial stocks of the two 
parties also decreases. At 100% TAR (Figure 10d), the financial stocks remain at approximately zero for both 
parties. Based on these findings, it can be concluded that TAR is suitable for maintaining financial equality 
between an airline and an airport. 
In addition, symmetry was found according to the even level among all of the time-series behaviors in 
Figures 10a–d. When the result is positive for the airline, the result is always negative for the airport, and vice 
versa. The movements are also totally symmetrical, meaning that load factor adjustment was satisfactory for 
improving the benefit to the airline, while simultaneously decreasing the benefit to the airport. Thus, an 
appropriate trade-off must be designed between the airline and the airport for the sake of long-term 
coexistence. Moreover, introducing load factor adjustment can change the time-series behaviors, but it cannot 
break the symmetry to an even level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10a. Financial stocks of the airline and airport 
(TAR = 25%) 
Figure 10b. Financial stocks of the airline and airport 
(TAR = 50%) 
 
 
          
          
 
 
Figure 10c. Financial stocks of the airline and airport 
(TAR = 75%) 
Figure 10d. Financial stocks of the airline and airport 
(TAR = 100%) 
 
4.3. The demand adjustment scenario 
The demand adjustment scenario was examined by highlighting the demand adjustment subsystem. It is 
assumed that an airport increases the number of air passengers in the case of certain discrepancies in the load 
factor. In this simulation, the airport increased demand by using ticket subsidy and assuming financial support 
from the local government that owned the airport, based on a discrepancy in the load factor of the previous 
month. 
The model includes the impact of subsidy payment and demand increase on both parties. Subsidy 
payment was subtracted from the financial stock of the airport since the subsidy requires the airport to bear 
some expenditure. In contrast, additional revenues are expected for the airline since the number of air 
passengers increased, due to the subsidy effect. Additional passenger revenue was computed as the product of 
subsidized passenger demand and average ticket price. A parametric study was implemented on the demand 
adjustment rate (DAR), setting it to 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%, without any adjustment to the load factor. 
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Figures 11a–d show the financial stocks of the airline and airport under the demand adjustment 
scenarios. There were no clear distinctions among the figures. However, a slight improvement was found in 
the financial stocks of both parties, especially after comparing them with the baseline (Figure 8). At 25% 
DAR (Figure 11a), no distinction was found between the demand adjustment scenario and the baseline 
scenario (Figure 8) during the first five years, indicating that demand adjustment was inactive since air 
passenger demand was adequate. After the sixth year, the demand adjustment was activated due to inadequate 
demand. At 50% DAR (Figure 11b), clearer improvements could be seen in the financial stocks of both parties 
after the fifth year, and the trend was the same as those at 75% DAR and 100% DAR. The results imply that 
introducing demand adjustment can positively impact both parties, given an appropriate DAR based on 
demand scarcity. 
In principle, it is expected that the higher the DAR, the higher the expenditures from the airport, 
meaning that the airport’s financial state worsens by the increased DAR. Interestingly, however, the airport’s 
financial state also improves with the increased DAR. This finding is based on the feedback effect of 
subsidized passenger demand, which contributes to an increase in the average load factor, which, in turn, 
decreases the guarantee fee paid by the airport. 
In all of the demand adjustment scenarios (Figures 11a–d), the financial stocks improved toward the end, 
due to additional (generated) demand. Furthermore, one party’s improvement was not realized at the cost of 
the other party. This finding implies that both an airline and an airport are likely to be satisfied with the 
business model, and thus, airline-airport coexistence can be sustained. 
It is concluded that introducing a monthly demand adjustment, as in the simulation, can break the 
symmetry to an even level for both parties, thus contributing to a more favorable commercial airway operation 
design. However, the demand adjustment in this simulation does not appear to lessen the discrepancy between 
the financial states of the two parties. This finding implies that financial equality between an airline and an 
airport cannot be balanced over the long term by the demand adjustment system. Therefore, this paper 
explores the possibility of combining both the TAR and the DAR in one scenario. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11a. Financial stocks of the airline and airport 
(DAR = 25%) 
Figure 11b. Financial stocks of the airline and airport 
(DAR = 50%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11c. Financial stocks of the airline and airport 
(DAR = 75%) 
 
Figure 11d. Financial stocks of the airline and airport 
(DAR = 100%) 
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4.4. The combination scenario 
 
The combination scenario was examined by highlighting both the target load factor adjustment 
subsystem and the demand adjustment subsystem. In addition, a parametric study was implemented on the 
TAR, setting it to 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% as well as on the DAR, setting it to 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%. 
Figures 12a–d show the financial stocks of the airline and the airport under the combination scenarios. 
When both the TAR and DAR were set to 25% (Figure 12a), the result was similar to that at 25% TAR 
(Figure 10a). The discrepancy between the two parties gradually increased throughout the simulation. 
Symmetry regarding the even level was broken, but the break was not distinctive. Thus, at 25%, the TAR has 
a greater influence on the system than the DAR. When both the TAR and DAR was set to 50% (Figure 12b), 
the discrepancy between the two parties decreased, compared to that in the case of 25% (Figure 12a). 
Furthermore, the financial states of both the airline and the airport improved. Symmetry regarding the even 
level was totally broken. The same trends were found in the cases of 75% (Figure 12c) and 100% (Figure 12d). 
As discussed earlier, the TAR can decrease the discrepancy in the financial states of an airline and an 
airport. Conversely, the DAR can break the symmetry and improve both parties’ financial states. Thus, a 
similar behavior was expected as that of the load factor adjustment scenarios (Figures 10a–d), with a certain 
positive shift due to demand adjustment. However, the simulation result was contrary to such an expectation, 
indicating that there is an effect of further demand generation resulting from the combination. The additional 
effect can be explained by the interaction between target load factor adjustment and demand adjustment. In 
this model, demand adjustment can generate additional demand until the annual average load factor reaches 
the target load factor. Given that the target load factor is fixed, the load factor adjustment only prevents 
deterioration in the financial state of the airport. In other words, an airport’s reaction is limited to minimizing 
the amount of loss, especially when a certain loss is expected at the end of each year. The only concern for the 
airport is the discrepancy between the target and the average load factors. There is no incentive for an   airport 
to go beyond the target load factor. 
However, introduction of the load factor adjustment removes this limitation. Since the target load factor 
changes on an annual basis, an airport must take care to meet an airline’s expectation. Given that an airport’s 
endeavor is only limited to filling the discrepancy between the target and the average load factors, the target 
load factor continuously decreases until the airline decides to cease the flight operation. Thus, there is a clear 
incentive for an airport to go beyond the target load factor for sustaining the airway. Furthermore, there is 
another incentive for an airport; that is, receiving cooperation fees from an airline. The cooperation fees 
contribute toward compensating for subsidy expenditures. This is why the airport proactively pays higher 
subsidies to go beyond the target load factor, especially under the combination scenarios. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12a. Financial stocks of the airline and airport 
(TAR = 25%, DAR = 25%) 
Figure 12b. Financial stocks of the airline and airport 
(TAR = 50%, DAR = 50%) 
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Figure 12c. Financial stocks of the airline and airport 
(TAR = 75%, DAR = 75%) 
Figure 12d. Financial stocks of the airline and airport 
(TAR = 100%, DAR = 100%) 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper used system dynamics to examine an interdependent business model (i.e., the LFG) for 
airline-airport coexistence. According to this model, an airline and an airport agree on the load factor of a 
flight and either party compensates for any discrepancy between the actual and agreed-upon load factors. The 
simulation results show that adjustments to the load factor can decrease any discrepancies  between the 
financial states of an airline and an airport. However, it cannot break the symmetry of both parties’ financial 
states. Conversely, adjustments to the demand can break the symmetry, but they cannot lessen the discrepancy. 
Thus, it is concluded that integrating load factor adjustment and monthly demand adjustment is the key to 
successful airline-airport coexistence. Although integration of a subsidy with an LFG means a temporary 
financial loss for the airport, research indicates that such a measure is effective for long-term airline-airport 
coexistence. 
However, current management practices are contrary to the findings of this paper. These practices only 
involve introducing the LFG to reduce business risk to an airline when pursuing a new entry. In Japan, most 
local governments provide subsidies to maintain unprofitable regional flights. However, such a subsidy policy 
is not optimally integrated with the LFG. Under the competitive environment, especially after deregulation, 
airports and airlines need to work together to improve and develop close partnerships (Graham, 2003). The 
proposed SD model can help airports and airlines better understand the interdependency of their businesses 
and how cooperation can enhance business sustainability. 
Finally, the present paper focused on the most fundamental actions and reactions by an airline and an 
airport. However, it is important to simulate various scenarios in order to study the interactions between the 
two parties. For example, future studies should vary the amount of the subsidy, compensation fee, and 
cooperation fee to better understand various system behaviors. In addition, this paper employed one 
performance measure of the load factor in the simulation. Thus, introducing multiple performance measures, 
such as traffic volumes and profit margins, can be more effective. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 2. Assumptions for baseline parameters (Source: NAPC, ANA, Ishikawa Prefecture) 
Variable name Value Unit 
 
Number of Flights per Day 4 Flights/Day 
Number of Seats per Aircraft 126 (2003), 164 (2004), 166 (2005–2014) Seats/Fleet 
Number of Days per Month 30 Days/Month 
Operation Reliability 0.9936 (2003), 0.9957 (2004), 0.9950(2005–2014)  
Fixed Ticket Price 135 ($1USD = 120JPY) USD/Ticket 
Airport Unit Payment 135 ($1USD = 120JPY) USD/Ticket 
Airline Unit Payment 90 ($1USD = 120JPY) USD/Ticket 
Price Adjustment Time 2 Month 
Price Elasticity of Demand −0.74 (Yamauchi 2000, 195–225)  
Load Factor Adjustment Rate 0  
Demand Adjustment Rate 0  
 
Table 3. Monthly passenger demand (NAPC, 2005–2014) 
 
Year 
 
Month 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
July 12,993 13,037 12,598 13,938 12,704 12,780 12,050 12,774 12,100 12,086 
Aug. 16,370 16,738 15,443 14,612 14,073 14,258 15,149 15,112 15,372 15,796 
Sep. 12,252 12,141 13,809 12,853 12,405 11,420 13,222 12,807 13,988 13,345 
Oct. 13,501 14,393 12,394 12,289 12,063 13,371 13,766 13,896 14,171 13,522 
Nov. 13,321 13,770 13,379 11,711 11,833 12,246 13,342 14,143 13,797 13,206 
Dec. 13,418 13,054 13,587 12,384 12,244 10,047 11,680 10,581 11,242 10,072 
Jan. 12,525 13,026 12,166 12,885 11,577 10,752 9,816 10,267 10,576 10,746 
Feb. 11,645 12,804 11,844 11,661 11,235 10,913 10,560 11,834 8,804 9,729 
March 15,511 12,776 13,288 13,443 13,209 9,348 11,314 12,851 12,657 11,782 
April 10,516 10,406 10,253 10,901 9,680 7,237 9,757 9,882 9,259 11,068 
May 14,521 11,421 14,711 12,589 13,725 10,792 12,761 13,630 13,052 13,811 
June 13,920 13,016 14,906 10,811 14,418 10,162 14,564 13,437 11,827 15,419 
 
Table 4. List of fundamental information for foreign market application 
 
Category Information 
 
 
 
Population of a target country (with growth rate) 
 
 
 
Gross Domestic Production (with growth rate) 
 
 
 
 
General Information 
Industrial structure of a target country 
 
 
  Air transportation network and passengers   
Highway network and passengers 
Highway bus network and passengers 
High speed train network and passengers 
Naval transport network and passengers 
Degree of competition among transportation measures 
Seasonality (climate, holiday structure, etc.) 
Societal constraints (awareness for environment, natural disaster, labor, etc.) 
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Airline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Airport 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Government 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Community 
Geographic characteristics 
Number of airlines operating in a target country 
 
 
Degree of competition among airlines operating in a target country 
Operation cost structure of a target airline 
Operational reliability of a target airline 
Number of airway operated by a target airline 
Number of flight per day operated by a target airline 
 
 
Number of flight per day for a target airway operated by a target airline 
Number of aircraft owned by a target airline 
Variety of aircraft owned by a target airline 
Size of aircraft utilized for a target airway 
Average ticket price for a target airway 
Discount scheme for a target airway offered by a target airline 
Number of airports in a target country 
Degree of competition among airports in a target country 
Airport development plan in a target country 
Number of passengers utilizing a target airport 
Operation cost structure of a target airport 
Ownership of a target airport 
Management structure of a target airport 
Financing structure of a target airport 
Ground access network to a target airport 
Facility of a target airport 
General policy for air transportation 
Open sky agreement 
Subsidy policy and program 
Tax rates 
Management structure 
Number of residents 
Number of tourists 
Local ground transport network 
Average expenditure by residents 
Average expenditure by visitors 
Accommodation capacity 
Local subsidy programs 
 
 
(a) Refereed full papers: 
Tan D & R Morimoto. ‘Tourism and income inequality in developing economies’ submitted 
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